Unsuccessful FOIA Requests: Masterlist (Reposted)

This is a reposting from the old site, as I haven’t had any FOIA requests rejected in the recent past. Presumably, the CIA is just sitting on them.

Successful FOIA Requests: Masterlist (updated)

This is the masterlist for successful FOIA requests and is updated every time a new document is obtained based on an FOIA request. There is also a list of unsuccessful FOIA requests. I have currently obtained four documents and one set of documents by FOIA.

Successful FOIA Request: FAA Phone Calls on Day of 9/11

I have obtained a new document via FOIA request. It is an FAA memo comprising a transcript of calls between various FAA facilities and other institutions on the day of 9/11, and was referenced in the 9/11 Commission Report, in endnote 128 to Chapter 1 (on page 459). It is not spectacularly exciting, but touches on awareness of all four hijacks, in particular the last three. You can find it here.

New FOIA Request Filed: DoJ Memo about Intelligence Sharing from December 1999

I have filed a new FOIA request for a DoJ memo regarding caveats on sharing NSA intelligence with the FBI. The memo is mentioned in endnote 38 on page 474 of the 9/11 Commission Report, as “DOJ memo, Reno to Freeh, E.O. 12333 authorized surveillance of a suspected al Qaeda operative, Dec. 24, 1999.” It is a source for the following paragraph in the report (pp. 79-80):

New FOIA Request Filed: CIA Briefing on Responsibility for USS Cole Bombing

I have filed a new FOIA request about the investigation of the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen. The document is referred to in the 9/11 Commission Report as “CIA briefing materials, ‘Intelligence Assessment: The Attack on the USS Cole,’ Dec. 21, 2000.” It is mentioned in endnote 144 on page 508 of the 9/11 Commission Report.

New FOIA Request Filed: Restrictions on Dissemination of NSA Information

I have filed a new FOIA request for four NSA documents. The documents relate to restrictions on the dissemination of NSA information inside the FBI. The restrictions were implemented in December 1999 because of the surveillance of three US persons somehow linked to Osama bin Laden outside the US by the NSA during the Millennium alert. Had the surveillance been inside the US, a warrant would have been obtained under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the information would have been covered by the 1995 procedures (a.k.a. “the Wall”). These procedures regulated the passage of information between intelligence agents in the FBI and criminal prosecutors (as well as criminal investigators at the FBI).

Cole Bombing: New FOIA Request Filed

I have filed another FOIA request regarding the bombing of the USS Cole. It is for an FBI document entitled “Source reporting on al-Qaeda” and is dated January 16, 2001. It is mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report in endnote 132 on page 507.

The reason I want this document is because it is related to the identification of al-Qaeda leader Khallad bin Attash in a photograph provided by the Yemeni authorities and in the Malaysia summit photographs in January 2001 by a joint FBI/CIA informer being used for the USS Cole investigation. Bin Attash was a key player in the 9/11 and Cole plots. The document should have mentioned his identification in the Malaysia photographs, which would have been a key link for the Cole investigators and an important piece of information that could have helped prevent 9/11. However, for some reason it is said to only mention the identification in the Yemeni photographs.

Successful FOIA Requests: Masterlist (updated)

This is the masterlist for successful FOIA requests and is updated every time a new document is obtained based on an FOIA request. There is also a list of unsuccessful FOIA requests. I have currently obtained four documents/sets of documents by FOIA.

Cole Bombing: Very Partial FOIA Success

Earlier this year I submitted an FOIA request to the FBI for a document reportedly produced in the Cole bombing investigation. It was a request sent by lead investigator Ali Soufan in July 2001 for information from the CIA about al-Qaeda’s Malaysia summit, where two or three 9/11 hijackers met al-Qaeda leaders. The CIA falsely claimed it knew nothing about the meeting, although it had actually monitored it quite closely and even followed one of the hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar, on his way there. Had the CIA not lied to Soufan, 9/11 may well have been prevented. The request and its rejection are covered in this entry.